We explicitly calculate price equilibria for power and logarithmic utility functions which--together with the exponential utility functions--form the so-called HARA (Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion) class.
INTRODUCTION
This paper follows up BUHLMANN (1980) . First we repeat some of the notions and results of BUHLMANN (1980) .
The market consists of n participants ("decision makers"), numbered from 1 to n, typically buyers of direct insurance, insurers, reinsurers.
Each participant i (1 ~< i~ < n) is characterized by w,: Initial wealth u,(x):
Utility function (as usual u',>0, u','~<O) X,(w): Initial portfolio (random variable) Y,(oJ): Payment (reimbursement) (random variable) bought for the premium E [~b Y,] . q~(oJ) is a price function.
REMARK. All random variables are given on a probability space (f~, ~, P) and are expected to be sufficiently regular in all cases. Particularly the appearing expected values should always exist.
The "exchange variable" Y,, bought by i, represents the payment which i obtains from the other participants. So the Yi, • -., Y, must satisfy the economic admissibility condition of the market 
is called an equdibrium risk exchange whereas ~ is an equilibrium price. Condition (II) implies that each participant evaluates his "situation" according to the principle of expected utility. In BUHLMANN (1980) is shown that (II) is equivalent to the condition (III) REMARK. Observe that (2) (as well as (1)) is a "clearing condition" in the market which is a closed system. REMARK. The existence of an equilibrium is dealt with in BOHLMANN (1984) (which follows up BUHLMANN (1980)).
EXPLICIT CALCULATIONS
We explicitly calculate equilibria where the utility functions u, are We can also write in the "Z-language" (as in (6)) .2,= x,-~,= % E x,+8,.
Hence according to the modified portfolio Z, participant i pays the quota % of the total claims ~ X, as well as a deterministic side payment 8,. This result does not surprise, see e.g., BUHLMANN and JEWELL (1979) .
I c>l (7) u,(x):=LT(a,~x) c for 0<c<l (l~l~<n). c<0 
where (9) Observe that it is indeed
E[(E a,-vZ w,±EX,)'-t(a,:rw,±X,)] 'Y,-E[(Z a, wZ w,± Z X,)C]
~, = +(2 a,~E w,). ~,, • (a, :~ w,).
X 'y,= 1, E 6,=0.
c>l REMARK. The case of three signs is for 0 < c < 1, whereas we put two signs c<0 c>l for 0~c<l" PROOF. With (7) we have (10) u,(x)=,+---v-,~-, t +c) (a,+x) and it follows from (III) and (5) (+c) (a,-~[w,-x 
E~,iEw, aEx,=~"~°-'~E\-~]
.
When we solve the last equation for ~, we obtain with the "norming condition" (4) the formula (8). We see that in the sequel it is enough to distinguish only two cases for the signs, concerning ~.
